The NZ Productivity Commission is currently systematically reviewing
tertiary education in this country. Chapter 12 of its draft report is
entitled ‘A System that Supports New Models’. Here are some highlights
(or lowlights): The re-introduction of interest rates on student loans,
universities given complete autonomy to set fees without regulatory caps
(‘unregulated fees’) to cover the full costs of providing degrees,
student education to be funded with vouchers and ‘student education
accounts’, tertiary education providers allowed to become
self-accrediting, universities given freedom to sell off assets to
private sector firms, and the abolition of the requirement for
university teaching to be researched based.You can download a PDF of the draft report 'New Models of Tertiary Education' here.
http://www.productivity.govt.nz/inquiry-report/new-models-of-tertiary-education-draft-report
The Productivity Commission was set up at the behest of the ACT party
(that hasn’t polled above 1% in 2016) during the Key Government’s first
term. You can check out the composition of its three person governing
board here.
http://www.productivity.govt.nz/about-us/our-team-0
Not surprisingly it is composed entirely of ardent
neoliberals, including former Treasury head from 1986 to 1993 Graham
Scott, former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank Murray Sherwin,
Professor of Management from the Victoria Business School Sally
Davenport.
Needless to say none of the board members have any
expertise whatsoever in areas such as educational sociology, political
economy, history, or political science (the humanities basically). But
they are all well versed in the central ideas of neoclassical economics,
neoliberal new public sector management and public choice theory, and
so forth. ‘Organic intellectuals of the ruling class’ as the Italian
socialist, Antonio Gramsci, would accurately categorise them. Their
influence must and will be resisted. Class war is looming right across
New Zealand's education system.
P.S. The submission process is obviously a facade designed to provide
legitimacy for what is a profoundly neoclassical and neoliberal
intellectual perspective. Let's not forget that in his previous role as
head of the Treasury from 1986 to 1993,
Graham Scott played a central role in the introduction of major tax cuts
for the rich in the late 1980s, the introduction of GST, the ECA and
major benefits cuts in the 1991 budget, and shifting the funding of
tertiary education away from barrier free tertiary education funded by
progressive taxation towards it being increasingly funded by tuition
fees and student loans.
Tuesday, 11 October 2016
Tuesday, 20 September 2016
Business Political Lobbying- The Structural Sources of Business Power and Working Class Resistance
My research on business political activity is part of my long running programme of research investigating the historical shift in New Zealand politics and policy-making from social democratic Keynesianism to neoliberalism (Roper, 1990; 1991; 2005). My analysis of this shift focuses on the highly complex and dynamic relationships between the capitalist economic system and social structure, class struggle and wider patterns of social conflict (including business lobbying activity), political parties (including the class alignments of the parties, leadership and policy changes, patterns of electoral support, composition of party membership and the major sources of campaign funding), the change in the prevailing economic orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, the media representation, popularisation and justification of neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’, and the state, including its specific institutional structure, the role and ideological orientation of state agencies involved in policy-making, the interests of state actors, and the party political composition of government.
With respect to the structural sources of business influence and working class resistance to neoliberalism, I am posting a section from a journal article published in the Royal Society journal- Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1177083X.2006.9522417
Capitalist Power versus Workers’ Power
The growing centralisation of capital ownership through merger and take-over activity, which is a central aspect of capitalist development in the historical long-term, concentrates a growing proportion of economic resources and power in a declining proportion of the total population (Callinicos and Harman, 1987: 30-31; Hayes, 2002: 25-27; 202-211; Wright, 2000: 44-46). This, together with the highly unequal distribution of income and wealth that capitalist exploitation generates, ensures that the business associations which represent capitalist interests are generally, but not always, able to exert considerably more influence over government than any other set of class-based interest groups (Lindblom, 1977: 170-200; Miliband, 1968: 131-160; Mulgan, 2004: 315-319; Roper, 1993).
Governments are likely to be receptive to this influence because the state is fiscally dependent upon the taxation of profits and incomes generated in the process of capital accumulation and also because, in the context of increasingly deregulated and internationally integrated financial and capital markets, governments that fail to heed the concerns of business may face the prospect of capital flight (Jessop, 1983b: 93).
Not only are these association better funded, with more organisational resources and staff, than trade unions, they also have more extensive connections with policy-making agencies (Brosnan et al. 1990: 118-121). In addition, business associations are supported in their lobbying activity by wider patterns of capitalist influence over politics and policy-making. Most obviously this includes regular corporate donations to political parties. As a former long-standing Chairman of the Business Roundtable, Douglas Myers, puts it, “cheque books are always open for political parties, as long as they get things right” (statement in Barry, 2002).
Business people also participate directly in political parties and parliamentary politics, are co-opted onto official policy-making bodies, and have far greater opportunities to interact in social settings with politicians than working class citizens. For example, with respect to the social composition of the New Zealand parliament it is noteworthy that:
Business people can use their wealth to fund advertising campaigns prompting pro-business policies and the publication of books, policy documents, pamphlets, academic research with a probusiness neoliberal ideological orientation, and right-wing (classical liberal) think tanks like the New Zealand Initiative. The extensive and centralised pattern of capitalist ownership of the electronic and print media, the reliance of state-owned media organisations upon private sector advertising for a significant share of their revenue, the capacity of business associations to produce an endless stream of polished press releases, and the real threat of legal and/or political flak if a media organisation is perceived to be anti-business, combine to ensure that the media functions in ways that maintain the ideological hegemony of the dominant capitalist class (Carey, 1987; Herman and Chomsky, 1994: 1-35).
For reasons such as these, the neopluralist Charles Lindblom (Professor of Political Science at Yale, past President of the American Political Science Association), is correct to argue that:
"Although business modifies its demands somewhat to avoid collision with electoral demands on government, the principal reconciliation between the two control systems [business controls versus electoral controls] comes about by adjusting electoral controls to make them consistent with those of business. Businesspeople bend or bring electoral controls into line by themselves entering into interest-group, party, and other electoral activities and achieving disproportionate influence on them" (1980: 77-8).
However, the power and influence that capitalists are able to exercise with respect to government policy-making is always contingent and frequently contested by organisations and movements based in the working class. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the Marxist conception of class struggle precisely implies a clash between classes with distinctive interests, powers, and collective capacities (Roper, 2004: 23-27; 2005: 91).
Hence sophisticated neopluralists like Mulgan (2004: 320-322) are right to stress the fact that, although business is generally able to exert a disproportionate influence over government policy-making, other interest groups and the mass of voters in liberal democracies are able to exert a degree of counter-veiling power. This is because, among other things, the working class constitutes a substantial majority of the population in advanced capitalist societies, which means that governments are constrained, albeit to a limited degree, by the need to retain the support of at least a significant minority of the working class electorate (Hayes, 2002: 207).
The numerical size of the working class means that the interest groups and movements based in this class generally have much larger memberships than those of business associations. Thus, for example, unions had 354,058 members in December 2004, vastly outnumbering the combined membership of New Zealand’s business associations (Blackwood et al. 2005: 80). Furthermore, workers are strategically located in capitalist economic systems, providing the labour that is an essential prerequisite of production, distribution and exchange, which means that when workers undertake mass strike action they can exert tremendous pressure on employers and/or governments.
Finally, the size of the working class means that this class provides a potential basis for the mass mobilisation of its members in street protests, such as those involving between 300,000 to 500,000 people who opposed the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991 or the mass protests across France in 2006 that successfully defeated the French Government’s attempt to introduce Contract of Initial Employment (CPE) legislation aimed at reducing young workers’ employment rights (Dannin, 1997: 146; Coupe & Perrin, 2006: 23-54).
The Shifting Balance of Class Forces and Government Policy-Making
In an insightful consideration of the relationship between business and government, Deeks argues that the neopluralist conception of business influence on government falsely assumes that “the power of business is relatively stable”, whereas in reality “the political power of business can and does vary” (1992: 4).
In this respect, it can be argued that the classical Marxist conception of the relationship between business and government is stronger than the neopluralist conception because Marxists emphasize that the outcomes of class struggle, and class based political lobbying and mobilisations directed towards the state, are always historically contingent, being determined by a wide range of circumstances that, in addition to “the economic situation”, may include “political forms of class struggle”, “the reflections of all of these real struggles in the brains of the participants”, juridical forms and decisions, “political, legal, philosophical theories”, “religious views”, in which there is a complex “interaction of all these elements” (Engels, 1975: 394). Furthermore, because Marx (1967: 20) “regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement” and therefore was concerned with its “transient nature no less than its momentary existence”, the Marxist tradition assumes that social and political arrangements are constantly changing, even if there is also a considerable degree of continuity with respect to the institutional structure of the state (Ollman 1990, 32).
From this perspective, explaining major political and policy change necessitates, among other things, an empirically and historically grounded analysis of employers’ organizations and business associations, on one side, trade unions and social movements on the other, as well as the shifting relationships between class based interest groups and social movements with the key actors and agencies operating within the institutional ensemble of the state.
The changing balance of class forces determines whether governments adopt reformist policies that incorporate, at least in part, the demands and aspirations of workers and/or social movements, or alternatively adopt policies that benefit the dominant capitalist class and its allies in the middle classes (such as farmers and members of the higher professions) while simultaneously disadvantaging the working class majority.
In this respect, Marxists and liberal pluralists share a kindred interest in the empirical study of interest groups because, despite all of the other substantial differences between these traditions, both consider that interest group activity profoundly influences government decision- and policy-making.
References
Barry A 2002. In a land of plenty. Video documentary produced by Community Media Trust in association with Vanguard Films, PO Box 3563, Wellington, New Zealand.
Blackwood, L, Feinberg-Danieli, Lafferty, G 2005. Unions and union membership in New Zealand: annual review for 2004. Journal of New Zealand Employment Relations 30(3): 79-89.
Brosnan, P, Smith, D, Walsh, P 1990. The dynamics of New Zealand industrial relations. Auckland: John Wiley & Sons.
BusinessNZ 2002. Submission on the Budget Policy Statement 2002. Wellington: BusinessNZ.
BusinessNZ 2005. The seven pillars of growth. Wellington: BusinessNZ.
BusinessNZ 2006. Brief to government. Wellington: BusinessNZ.
Callinicos, A 1987. Making history. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Callinicos, A, Harman, C 1987. The changing working class. London: Bookmarks.
Carey, A 1987. The ideological management industry. In: Wheelwright, T, Buckley ed. Communications and the media in Australia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Pp 156-179.
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2003. Achieving faster growth for New Zealand. Wellington: New Zealand Chambers of Commerce.
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2005. Election manifesto. Wellington: New Zealand Chambers of Commerce.
Chernomas, R. 1983. Keynesian, monetarist and post-Keynesian policy: a Marxist analysis. Studies in Political Economy 10: 123-142.
Coupe, A, Perrin, M 2006. France’s extraordinary movement. International Socialism 111: 23-34.
Cronin, B 2001. The politics of NZ business internationalisation, 1972-1996. Unpublished Phd thesis in Political Studies, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
Dannin, E 1997. Working free. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Deeks, J 1992. Business, government and interest-group politics. In: Deeks, J ed. Controlling interests. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Pp 1-15.
Deeks, J 1997. Business and politics. In: Miller, R ed. New Zealand politics in transition. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Pp 428-436.
Engels, F 1975. Letter to Joseph Block. In: Marx, K, Engels, F Selected correspondence. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Pp 394-396.
FF 2002. President’s address to FF national conference 2002. Wellington: FF.
FF 2003. Submission on the Budget Policy Statement 2003. Wellington: FF.
Fraser, I 2006. Keeping government business friendly? A case study of the relationship between Business NZ and the fifth labour government. Unpublished BA hons thesis, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
Giddens, A 1979. Central problems in modern social theory. London: Macmillan Press.
Harris, P. and Twiname, L 1998. First knights: an investigation of the New Zealand Business Roundtable. Auckland: A Howling at the Moon publication.
Hayes, P 2002. The origins and dynamics of New Zealand’s changing class structure. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
Herman, S, Chomsky, N 1994. Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media. London: Vintage.
Hope, W 1991. Media representations of the New Zealand economy. Unpublished Phd thesis in Political Studies, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
Hyman, R, Fryer R 1977. Trade unions: sociology and political economy. In: Clarke, T, Clements, L ed. Trade unions under capitalism. Sussex: The Harvester Press.
Jesson, B 1987. Behind the Mirror Glass. Auckland: Penguin.
Jesson, B 1999. Only Their Purpose Is Mad. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Jessop, B 1983a. The capitalist state and the rule of capital: problems in the analysis of business associations. West European Politics 6 (2): 139-162.
Jessop, B 1983b. The democratic state and the national interest. In: Coates, D, Johnston, G eds. Socialist Arguments. Oxford: Martin Robertson Pp 83-106.
Lindblom, C 1977. Politics and markets. New York: Basic Books
Lindblom, C 1980. The policy-making process. 2nd edn. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Marx, K 1967. Capital, Volume I. New York: International Publishers.
Miliband, R 1968. The state in capitalist society. London: Quartet Books.
Mulgan, R 1993. A pluralist analysis of the state. In Roper B, Rudd C ed. State and economy in New Zealand. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Pp 128-146.
Mulgan, R 2004. Politics in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Murray, G 1989. New Zealand Corporate Class Networks. New Zealand Sociology 4 (2): 115-163.
NZBR 1989. Economic and social policy. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1992a. From recession to recovery. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1992b. Budgetary stress – why New Zealand needs to reduce government spending, deficits and debt. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1992c. The public benefit of private ownership. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1999a. Turning gain into pain. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1999b. MMP: the right decision? Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2002. Getting serious about economic growth. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2005a. Getting better value for money in public spending. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2005b. Business Roundtable perspectives on the next three years. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2005c. Economic success and how to get more of it. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2006. Submission on the 2006 Budget Policy Statement. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR and NZEF 1996. The status and jurisdiction of the Employment Court. Wellington: NZBR.
NZEF 1999. Taxes we love to hate them. Wellington: NZEF
NZMF 1990. The importance of manufacturing. Wellington: NZMF.
NZRA 2004. Submission of the NZRA to the Minister of Labour on the 2005 Review of the Minimum Wage. Wellington: NZRA.
NZRA 2005. Submission of the NZRA in relation to the Employment Relations Law Reform Bill 2003. Wellington: NZRA.
NZRA 2006. Submission of the NZRA in relation to Parental Leave & Employment Protection (Paid Parental Leave for Self-Employed Persons) Amendment Bill. Wellington: NZRA.
Offe, C 1985. Disorganised capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ollman, B 1990. Putting dialectics to work: the process of abstraction in Marx’s method. Rethinking Marxism 3(1): 26-74.
Pilj, K 1984. The making of an Atlantic ruling class. London: Verso.
Roper, B 1990. The dynamics of capital in crisis: the political economy of New Zealand business, 1974 to 1987. Unpublished Phd thesis, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
Roper, B 1991. From the welfare state to the free market: explaining the transition. Part II: crisis, class, ideology and the state. New Zealand Sociology 6 (2): 135-76.
Roper, B 1992. Business political activism and the emergence of the new right in New Zealand, 1975-87. Political Science 44 (2): 1-23.
Roper, B 1993. A level playing field? Business political activism and state policy formation. In Roper B, Rudd C ed. State and economy in New Zealand. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Pp 147-171.
Roper, B 2004. The globalisation of revolt. Red& Green 3: 13-36.
Roper, B 2005. Towards prosperity? Economic, social and political change in New Zealand since 1935. Victoria: Thomson Publishing.
Shaikh, A 1990. Capital as a social relation. In: Eatwell, J, Milgate, M, Newman, P eds. The new palgrave: Marxian economics. London: Macmillan. Pp 72-78.
Shaw, R, Eichbaum, C 2005. Public policy in New Zealand. Auckland: Pearson Speed Print.
Tenbensel, T 2006. Interest groups. In: Miller, R ed. New Zealand politics and government. 4th edn. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Pp 525-535.
Wood, G, Rudd, C 2004. The politics and government of New Zealand. Dunedin: Otago University Press.
Wright, E 2000. Class counts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
With respect to the structural sources of business influence and working class resistance to neoliberalism, I am posting a section from a journal article published in the Royal Society journal- Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1177083X.2006.9522417
Capitalist Power versus Workers’ Power
The growing centralisation of capital ownership through merger and take-over activity, which is a central aspect of capitalist development in the historical long-term, concentrates a growing proportion of economic resources and power in a declining proportion of the total population (Callinicos and Harman, 1987: 30-31; Hayes, 2002: 25-27; 202-211; Wright, 2000: 44-46). This, together with the highly unequal distribution of income and wealth that capitalist exploitation generates, ensures that the business associations which represent capitalist interests are generally, but not always, able to exert considerably more influence over government than any other set of class-based interest groups (Lindblom, 1977: 170-200; Miliband, 1968: 131-160; Mulgan, 2004: 315-319; Roper, 1993).
Governments are likely to be receptive to this influence because the state is fiscally dependent upon the taxation of profits and incomes generated in the process of capital accumulation and also because, in the context of increasingly deregulated and internationally integrated financial and capital markets, governments that fail to heed the concerns of business may face the prospect of capital flight (Jessop, 1983b: 93).
Not only are these association better funded, with more organisational resources and staff, than trade unions, they also have more extensive connections with policy-making agencies (Brosnan et al. 1990: 118-121). In addition, business associations are supported in their lobbying activity by wider patterns of capitalist influence over politics and policy-making. Most obviously this includes regular corporate donations to political parties. As a former long-standing Chairman of the Business Roundtable, Douglas Myers, puts it, “cheque books are always open for political parties, as long as they get things right” (statement in Barry, 2002).
Business people also participate directly in political parties and parliamentary politics, are co-opted onto official policy-making bodies, and have far greater opportunities to interact in social settings with politicians than working class citizens. For example, with respect to the social composition of the New Zealand parliament it is noteworthy that:
“In 2014 28 MPs (23% of MPs) listed
their previous occupation as a ‘business
person’; apart from 1999 and 2008 this has
been the single biggest occupational category in NZ Parliaments since 1990.”
http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/parl-support/research-papers/00PLLawRP2015011/final-results-2014-general-election
http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/parl-support/research-papers/00PLLawRP2015011/final-results-2014-general-election
Business people can use their wealth to fund advertising campaigns prompting pro-business policies and the publication of books, policy documents, pamphlets, academic research with a probusiness neoliberal ideological orientation, and right-wing (classical liberal) think tanks like the New Zealand Initiative. The extensive and centralised pattern of capitalist ownership of the electronic and print media, the reliance of state-owned media organisations upon private sector advertising for a significant share of their revenue, the capacity of business associations to produce an endless stream of polished press releases, and the real threat of legal and/or political flak if a media organisation is perceived to be anti-business, combine to ensure that the media functions in ways that maintain the ideological hegemony of the dominant capitalist class (Carey, 1987; Herman and Chomsky, 1994: 1-35).
For reasons such as these, the neopluralist Charles Lindblom (Professor of Political Science at Yale, past President of the American Political Science Association), is correct to argue that:
"Although business modifies its demands somewhat to avoid collision with electoral demands on government, the principal reconciliation between the two control systems [business controls versus electoral controls] comes about by adjusting electoral controls to make them consistent with those of business. Businesspeople bend or bring electoral controls into line by themselves entering into interest-group, party, and other electoral activities and achieving disproportionate influence on them" (1980: 77-8).
However, the power and influence that capitalists are able to exercise with respect to government policy-making is always contingent and frequently contested by organisations and movements based in the working class. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the Marxist conception of class struggle precisely implies a clash between classes with distinctive interests, powers, and collective capacities (Roper, 2004: 23-27; 2005: 91).
Hence sophisticated neopluralists like Mulgan (2004: 320-322) are right to stress the fact that, although business is generally able to exert a disproportionate influence over government policy-making, other interest groups and the mass of voters in liberal democracies are able to exert a degree of counter-veiling power. This is because, among other things, the working class constitutes a substantial majority of the population in advanced capitalist societies, which means that governments are constrained, albeit to a limited degree, by the need to retain the support of at least a significant minority of the working class electorate (Hayes, 2002: 207).
The numerical size of the working class means that the interest groups and movements based in this class generally have much larger memberships than those of business associations. Thus, for example, unions had 354,058 members in December 2004, vastly outnumbering the combined membership of New Zealand’s business associations (Blackwood et al. 2005: 80). Furthermore, workers are strategically located in capitalist economic systems, providing the labour that is an essential prerequisite of production, distribution and exchange, which means that when workers undertake mass strike action they can exert tremendous pressure on employers and/or governments.
Finally, the size of the working class means that this class provides a potential basis for the mass mobilisation of its members in street protests, such as those involving between 300,000 to 500,000 people who opposed the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991 or the mass protests across France in 2006 that successfully defeated the French Government’s attempt to introduce Contract of Initial Employment (CPE) legislation aimed at reducing young workers’ employment rights (Dannin, 1997: 146; Coupe & Perrin, 2006: 23-54).
The Shifting Balance of Class Forces and Government Policy-Making
In an insightful consideration of the relationship between business and government, Deeks argues that the neopluralist conception of business influence on government falsely assumes that “the power of business is relatively stable”, whereas in reality “the political power of business can and does vary” (1992: 4).
In this respect, it can be argued that the classical Marxist conception of the relationship between business and government is stronger than the neopluralist conception because Marxists emphasize that the outcomes of class struggle, and class based political lobbying and mobilisations directed towards the state, are always historically contingent, being determined by a wide range of circumstances that, in addition to “the economic situation”, may include “political forms of class struggle”, “the reflections of all of these real struggles in the brains of the participants”, juridical forms and decisions, “political, legal, philosophical theories”, “religious views”, in which there is a complex “interaction of all these elements” (Engels, 1975: 394). Furthermore, because Marx (1967: 20) “regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement” and therefore was concerned with its “transient nature no less than its momentary existence”, the Marxist tradition assumes that social and political arrangements are constantly changing, even if there is also a considerable degree of continuity with respect to the institutional structure of the state (Ollman 1990, 32).
From this perspective, explaining major political and policy change necessitates, among other things, an empirically and historically grounded analysis of employers’ organizations and business associations, on one side, trade unions and social movements on the other, as well as the shifting relationships between class based interest groups and social movements with the key actors and agencies operating within the institutional ensemble of the state.
The changing balance of class forces determines whether governments adopt reformist policies that incorporate, at least in part, the demands and aspirations of workers and/or social movements, or alternatively adopt policies that benefit the dominant capitalist class and its allies in the middle classes (such as farmers and members of the higher professions) while simultaneously disadvantaging the working class majority.
In this respect, Marxists and liberal pluralists share a kindred interest in the empirical study of interest groups because, despite all of the other substantial differences between these traditions, both consider that interest group activity profoundly influences government decision- and policy-making.
References
Barry A 2002. In a land of plenty. Video documentary produced by Community Media Trust in association with Vanguard Films, PO Box 3563, Wellington, New Zealand.
Blackwood, L, Feinberg-Danieli, Lafferty, G 2005. Unions and union membership in New Zealand: annual review for 2004. Journal of New Zealand Employment Relations 30(3): 79-89.
Brosnan, P, Smith, D, Walsh, P 1990. The dynamics of New Zealand industrial relations. Auckland: John Wiley & Sons.
BusinessNZ 2002. Submission on the Budget Policy Statement 2002. Wellington: BusinessNZ.
BusinessNZ 2005. The seven pillars of growth. Wellington: BusinessNZ.
BusinessNZ 2006. Brief to government. Wellington: BusinessNZ.
Callinicos, A 1987. Making history. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Callinicos, A, Harman, C 1987. The changing working class. London: Bookmarks.
Carey, A 1987. The ideological management industry. In: Wheelwright, T, Buckley ed. Communications and the media in Australia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Pp 156-179.
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2003. Achieving faster growth for New Zealand. Wellington: New Zealand Chambers of Commerce.
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2005. Election manifesto. Wellington: New Zealand Chambers of Commerce.
Chernomas, R. 1983. Keynesian, monetarist and post-Keynesian policy: a Marxist analysis. Studies in Political Economy 10: 123-142.
Coupe, A, Perrin, M 2006. France’s extraordinary movement. International Socialism 111: 23-34.
Cronin, B 2001. The politics of NZ business internationalisation, 1972-1996. Unpublished Phd thesis in Political Studies, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
Dannin, E 1997. Working free. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Deeks, J 1992. Business, government and interest-group politics. In: Deeks, J ed. Controlling interests. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Pp 1-15.
Deeks, J 1997. Business and politics. In: Miller, R ed. New Zealand politics in transition. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Pp 428-436.
Engels, F 1975. Letter to Joseph Block. In: Marx, K, Engels, F Selected correspondence. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Pp 394-396.
FF 2002. President’s address to FF national conference 2002. Wellington: FF.
FF 2003. Submission on the Budget Policy Statement 2003. Wellington: FF.
Fraser, I 2006. Keeping government business friendly? A case study of the relationship between Business NZ and the fifth labour government. Unpublished BA hons thesis, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
Giddens, A 1979. Central problems in modern social theory. London: Macmillan Press.
Harris, P. and Twiname, L 1998. First knights: an investigation of the New Zealand Business Roundtable. Auckland: A Howling at the Moon publication.
Hayes, P 2002. The origins and dynamics of New Zealand’s changing class structure. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
Herman, S, Chomsky, N 1994. Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media. London: Vintage.
Hope, W 1991. Media representations of the New Zealand economy. Unpublished Phd thesis in Political Studies, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
Hyman, R, Fryer R 1977. Trade unions: sociology and political economy. In: Clarke, T, Clements, L ed. Trade unions under capitalism. Sussex: The Harvester Press.
Jesson, B 1987. Behind the Mirror Glass. Auckland: Penguin.
Jesson, B 1999. Only Their Purpose Is Mad. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Jessop, B 1983a. The capitalist state and the rule of capital: problems in the analysis of business associations. West European Politics 6 (2): 139-162.
Jessop, B 1983b. The democratic state and the national interest. In: Coates, D, Johnston, G eds. Socialist Arguments. Oxford: Martin Robertson Pp 83-106.
Lindblom, C 1977. Politics and markets. New York: Basic Books
Lindblom, C 1980. The policy-making process. 2nd edn. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Marx, K 1967. Capital, Volume I. New York: International Publishers.
Miliband, R 1968. The state in capitalist society. London: Quartet Books.
Mulgan, R 1993. A pluralist analysis of the state. In Roper B, Rudd C ed. State and economy in New Zealand. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Pp 128-146.
Mulgan, R 2004. Politics in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Murray, G 1989. New Zealand Corporate Class Networks. New Zealand Sociology 4 (2): 115-163.
NZBR 1989. Economic and social policy. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1992a. From recession to recovery. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1992b. Budgetary stress – why New Zealand needs to reduce government spending, deficits and debt. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1992c. The public benefit of private ownership. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1999a. Turning gain into pain. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 1999b. MMP: the right decision? Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2002. Getting serious about economic growth. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2005a. Getting better value for money in public spending. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2005b. Business Roundtable perspectives on the next three years. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2005c. Economic success and how to get more of it. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR 2006. Submission on the 2006 Budget Policy Statement. Wellington: NZBR.
NZBR and NZEF 1996. The status and jurisdiction of the Employment Court. Wellington: NZBR.
NZEF 1999. Taxes we love to hate them. Wellington: NZEF
NZMF 1990. The importance of manufacturing. Wellington: NZMF.
NZRA 2004. Submission of the NZRA to the Minister of Labour on the 2005 Review of the Minimum Wage. Wellington: NZRA.
NZRA 2005. Submission of the NZRA in relation to the Employment Relations Law Reform Bill 2003. Wellington: NZRA.
NZRA 2006. Submission of the NZRA in relation to Parental Leave & Employment Protection (Paid Parental Leave for Self-Employed Persons) Amendment Bill. Wellington: NZRA.
Offe, C 1985. Disorganised capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ollman, B 1990. Putting dialectics to work: the process of abstraction in Marx’s method. Rethinking Marxism 3(1): 26-74.
Pilj, K 1984. The making of an Atlantic ruling class. London: Verso.
Roper, B 1990. The dynamics of capital in crisis: the political economy of New Zealand business, 1974 to 1987. Unpublished Phd thesis, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
Roper, B 1991. From the welfare state to the free market: explaining the transition. Part II: crisis, class, ideology and the state. New Zealand Sociology 6 (2): 135-76.
Roper, B 1992. Business political activism and the emergence of the new right in New Zealand, 1975-87. Political Science 44 (2): 1-23.
Roper, B 1993. A level playing field? Business political activism and state policy formation. In Roper B, Rudd C ed. State and economy in New Zealand. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Pp 147-171.
Roper, B 2004. The globalisation of revolt. Red& Green 3: 13-36.
Roper, B 2005. Towards prosperity? Economic, social and political change in New Zealand since 1935. Victoria: Thomson Publishing.
Shaikh, A 1990. Capital as a social relation. In: Eatwell, J, Milgate, M, Newman, P eds. The new palgrave: Marxian economics. London: Macmillan. Pp 72-78.
Shaw, R, Eichbaum, C 2005. Public policy in New Zealand. Auckland: Pearson Speed Print.
Tenbensel, T 2006. Interest groups. In: Miller, R ed. New Zealand politics and government. 4th edn. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Pp 525-535.
Wood, G, Rudd, C 2004. The politics and government of New Zealand. Dunedin: Otago University Press.
Wright, E 2000. Class counts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thursday, 28 July 2016
World Bank Data Confirms that Big Business Has Lobbied Successfully For Reductions in the Tax Rates Paid by Corporations on Profits from 2000 to 2015
Very interesting interactive graph from the World Bank (Average percentage tax rate
on corporate profit from 2000 to 2015). Provides empirical confirmation
for the view that big business has been successfully reducing the amount
of tax that it pays on profits during the past 15 years (actually it
has been doing this since the late 1970s.)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.TAX.TOTL.CP.ZS
Details: "Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions as a share of commercial profits. Taxes withheld (such as personal income tax) or collected and remitted to tax authorities (such as value added taxes, sales taxes or goods and service taxes) are excluded.
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project (doingbusiness.org).
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.TAX.TOTL.CP.ZS
Details: "Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions as a share of commercial profits. Taxes withheld (such as personal income tax) or collected and remitted to tax authorities (such as value added taxes, sales taxes or goods and service taxes) are excluded.
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project (doingbusiness.org).
Monday, 11 July 2016
Business Political Activity in New Zealand from 1990 to 2005
Here is the link to a journal article on this topic published in 2006. The PDF can be download for free. The general and historic points remain relevant.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1177083X.2006.9522417
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1177083X.2006.9522417
POLS 323 Marxism: Classical and Contemporary - Videos and Links
This is where I'll be putting links to audio-visual and other material for POLS 323 Marxism: Classical and Contemporary during Semester 2, 2016. I will be adding to, editing, and updating this blog during the course of the semester. So it is a work in progress.
Some of the av-material and links overlap with POLS 208 Democracy, so check that blog out as well. http://briansroper.blogspot.co.nz/2016/02/pols-208-democracy-videos-and-links-2016.html
The lecture schedule is outlined below.
Rosa Luxemburg - Then and Now
Lenin - What is Soviet Power?
Five minute speech by Lenin with English subtitles.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-l53FPENoAU
Another interesting short speech by Lenin:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_EcpFLmUaU
The climate crisis of the 21st century has been caused largely by just 90 companies, which between them produced nearly two-thirds of the greenhouse gas emissions generated since the dawning of the industrial age, new research suggests."
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20/90-companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change
• Climate Central - a US based research foundation - has an interactive 'Surging Seas' map that allows you to see the degree of encroachment on land of sea level rises.
http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/
• A Twenty Year Programme of Neoliberal Fiscal Austerity?
British Cabinet Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, said in 2013 that the cuts pushed through by the Coalition did not go nearly far enough. He said that there was a “very long way to go” and added: “This is not a two-year project or a five-year project. This is a 10-year project, a 20-year generational battle to beef up the economy in ways that we have not seen for many, many decades.”
Some of the av-material and links overlap with POLS 208 Democracy, so check that blog out as well. http://briansroper.blogspot.co.nz/2016/02/pols-208-democracy-videos-and-links-2016.html
The lecture schedule is outlined below.
Lecture
Schedule
Introduction
1. What is Marxism? Is Marxism Still Relevant?
Why Classical and Contemporary Marxism?
Section 1: Laying the Foundations: Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels
2. Karl
Marx: Intellectual Significance, Biography and Historical Context
3. Marx’s
General Theory of History: Dialectical and Historical Marxism
4. Marx’s
Critique of Capitalism: Analysing Capitalist Exploitation to Explain Inequality in Capitalist Society
5. Marx’s
Critique of Capitalism: The Causes of Capitalist Economic Crises
6. Marx’s
Critique of Capitalism: What is Alienation? What’s Wrong with Liberal
Democracy?
7. Frederick Engels’ Contribution to
Establishing Marxism: Social History, Dialectics, Women’s Oppression, Editor
and Populariser of Marx’s Writings.
Section 2: Classical Marxism: Overview, Context and Key
Figures
8. Classical
Marxism and Lenin’s Theory of Revolution
9. Lenin’s Conceptualisation and Defence of Socialist Organisation
10. Rosa
Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution?
11. Rosa
Luxemburg: The Mass Strike and Luxemburg’s Critique of the Bolsheviks
12. Leon
Trotsky: The Fight Against Stalinism
13. Antonio
Gramsci: Hegemony and Contradictory Consciousness
14. The
Classical Marxist Vision of Socialism: Revolution, Socialism and Participatory
Democracy
----------------Mid-Semester
Break----------------
Section 3: Contemporary Marxism
15. Marxist
Economics: The Global Financial Crisis and its Aftermath
16. Marxist
Educational Sociology: Neoliberalism’s War on Higher Education
17. Marxist
International Relations: Imperialism and the Causes of War
18. Applying
Marxism in Practice: The International Socialist Tradition
19. Marxist
Ecology: Analysing the Causes of Resource Depletion, Habitat Destruction, and
Global Warming
20. Socialist
and Marxist Feminism: Capitalism, Gender Inequality and Women’s Liberation
21. The Ideological Bias of the Corporate Media:
Manufacturing Consent?
Section 4: Anti-Marxism
22. The Neoliberal Critique of Marxism
23. The
Anarchist Critique of Marxism
24. The Post-Structuralist Critique of Marxism
Conclusion:
Results and Prospects
25. The Democratic Socialist Alternative to 21st
Century Capitalism.
26. Summary
of Course
Videos and Links
Introductions to Marx and Marxism
Rosa Luxemburg - Then and Now
An excellent slideshow with Alistair Hulett singing the Internationale in the background.
Lenin - What is Soviet Power?
Five minute speech by Lenin with English subtitles.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-l53FPENoAU
Another interesting short speech by Lenin:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_EcpFLmUaU
The climate crisis of the 21st century has been caused largely by just 90 companies, which between them produced nearly two-thirds of the greenhouse gas emissions generated since the dawning of the industrial age, new research suggests."
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20/90-companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change
• Climate Central - a US based research foundation - has an interactive 'Surging Seas' map that allows you to see the degree of encroachment on land of sea level rises.
http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/
• A Twenty Year Programme of Neoliberal Fiscal Austerity?
British Cabinet Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, said in 2013 that the cuts pushed through by the Coalition did not go nearly far enough. He said that there was a “very long way to go” and added: “This is not a two-year project or a five-year project. This is a 10-year project, a 20-year generational battle to beef up the economy in ways that we have not seen for many, many decades.”
The Neoliberal Critique of Marxism
•
Chicago and monetarist economist, Milton Friedman, providing a neoliberal justification of the unequal distribution of wealth in advanced capitalist societies.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJwUaVDIPXg
•
Disposable Heroes Of Hiphoprisy, the - Television, The Drug Of The Nation
Junkie XL Feat. Peter Tosh - Dont Wake Up Policeman (Sander Kleinenbergs Cold Turkey Remix)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASdWzoQGEcg
• Princess Chelsea - Too Many People
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj2Xq5W7ywc
• Parquet Courts - Berlin Got Blurry
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hv0bBjMc6FY
• PJ Harvey - The Wheel
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ReW0jJkag8
• Courtney Barnett and Billy Bragg cover Velvet Underground's 'Sunday Morning'
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Yg6xDAekPI
• Aracade Fire - The Suburbs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtIkPLM13so
POLS 323 Music Videos
Disposable Heroes Of Hiphoprisy, the - Television, The Drug Of The Nation
Junkie XL Feat. Peter Tosh - Dont Wake Up Policeman (Sander Kleinenbergs Cold Turkey Remix)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASdWzoQGEcg
• Princess Chelsea - Too Many People
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj2Xq5W7ywc
• Parquet Courts - Berlin Got Blurry
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hv0bBjMc6FY
• Gil Scott-Heron - The Revolution Will Not Be Televised (Full Band Version)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qGaoXAwl9kw • PJ Harvey - The Wheel
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ReW0jJkag8
• Courtney Barnett and Billy Bragg cover Velvet Underground's 'Sunday Morning'
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Yg6xDAekPI
• Aracade Fire - The Suburbs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtIkPLM13so
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